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Abstract 
Using comparable survey data from twelve European countries from 1994 to 2001 we investigate 
households’ attitudes towards mortgage indebtedness. We find that a given debt burden creates 
much higher distress in countries with fewer mortgage holders relative to countries where a 
significant part of households uses mortgage debt. This effect is net of ppp-adjusted income 
levels, various socioeconomic characteristics, housing traits, country-specific constant terms, and 
household unobserved heterogeneity. We show that households evaluate their own debt burden 
partly in comparison with the debt position of their peer group and in a way consistent with social 
stigma considerations which lessen in significance as markets expand. 
JEL classification: D12, D14, G21 
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Non-technical summary 
Using comparable survey data from twelve European countries from 1994 to 2001 we 
investigate households’ attitudes towards mortgage indebtedness. We find that a given 
debt burden creates much higher distress in countries with fewer mortgage holders 
relative to countries where a significant part of households uses mortgage debt. This is 
the case after taking into account ppp-adjusted income levels, a rich set of socioeconomic 
characteristics, housing traits, country-specific constant terms, and household unobserved 
heterogeneity. We attribute part of this asymmetry to cross-country differences in the 
expansion of credit markets, which facilitate differential access to liquidity. Household’s 
reported distress is also affected by excess indebtedness relative to the debt load of 
reference households, and crucially so in countries with less expanded mortgage markets. 
Thus it appears that households evaluate their own debt burden partly in comparison with 
the debt position of their peer group and in a way consistent with social stigma 
considerations which lessen in significance as markets expand. Households’ assessment 
of a debt burden therefore tends to diminish in more expanded credit markets and this 
process can be reinforced by reference to other households in a growing pool of debt 
holders. 6
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1156
February 2010
1. Introduction 
Households’ borrowing decisions are important, for their own well-being and for 
aggregate consumption, asset demand and financial stability. In recent years, households 
have experienced a rapid expansion of credit markets and may have been encouraged by 
the financial sector to take out mortgages and consumer loans. Problems start to arise 
when households borrow amounts that are disproportional to their means. During 
unfavourable macroeconomic conditions, where unemployment rates rise and household 
assets depreciate in value, such a tendency may result in an inability to pay off loans. At 
the same time, the market loses confidence in assets that have been used to secure such 
loans and the setbacks incurred can be traced back as one of the main sources of the 
recent financial crisis. Thus, understanding the conditions that shape households’ 
borrowing behaviour is of key importance. 
Domestic property is the dominant asset category in household portfolios, 
especially in Europe. On the liability side, mortgages typically represent the largest debt 
burden.
1 Home ownership rates are particularly high in Southern European countries like 
Italy, Spain, and Greece, yet relatively few households in these countries own their home 
through a mortgage. On the other hand, mortgages are very widespread among 
homeowners in Denmark, the Netherlands, and the UK. The likely causes of this 
asymmetry between the prevalence of homeownership and expansion of mortgage 
markets in Europe merit further investigation. In this paper, we focus instead on 
                                                     
1 For a recent cross-country comparison of household wealth holdings in both sides of the Atlantic, see Christelis, 
Georgarakos and Haliassos (2009). 7
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disparities in households’ borrowing attitudes, given that they face mortgage markets 
with a different degree of expansion. 
It is often presumed that if more people in a society get into debt, they become 
more familiar with the idea of borrowing and subsequently less concerned in servicing a 
high debt burden. Such a conjecture has often been made in the UK, for example, to 
justify how, from a common sense of shame about debt in the past, households have 
recently moved to a debt of more than 1 trillion pounds and to mortgage borrowing that 
can in some cases exceed house purchasing prices.
2 In this paper, we find novel empirical 
evidence that households’ perceived vulnerability to debt is crucially affected not only by 
their own indebtedness, but also by the fact that their own debt burden exceeds that of 
households in their reference group. Moreover, the influence of relative indebtedness is 
particularly strong in countries with less expanded mortgage markets lending empirical 
support to the above conjecture. 
We use household-level, internationally comparable panel data from the 
European Community Household Panel survey (ECHP) which represents a rich source of 
information on incomes, various demographics, mortgage indebtedness, and subjective 
well-being. The ECHP asks households explicitly about their financial difficulties due to 
mortgage repayments and housing costs. We exploit this information to investigate the 
extent to which mortgage indebtedness induces financial distress across countries with a 
different expansion of mortgage markets, while the panel nature of the survey allows us 
to take into account the fact that reported difficulties are to a certain degree subjective.  
                                                     
2 See for example the article “How debt culture took root”, by Julian Knight at BBC online news; available at:   
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3837419.stm 8
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Recent studies have used the ECHP to examine determinants that increase the 
likelihood of a household to fall into arrears (Duygan and Grant, 2009) and to associate 
such incidents with institutional factors, like information sharing arrangements, judicial 
efficiency, and individual bankruptcy regulation (Jappelli, Pagano, Di Maggio, 2008). 
Our focus is quite different. We explore the links between mortgage indebtedness and 
reported distress to gain insights into households’ assessment of their debt burden and the 
associated propensity to assume a debt load that under adverse macroeconomic 
conditions may prove infeasible to service. 
First, we show that a higher mortgage debt to income ratio represents a key 
determinant of financial distress. However, a given level of indebtedness creates much 
higher distress in Southern countries, France, and Belgium, where a minority of 
households have a mortgage outstanding, compared to countries where a sizeable part of 
the population uses mortgage debt like the UK, the Netherlands, and Denmark. This 
effect is net of ppp-adjusted income levels, a rich set of socioeconomic characteristics, 
housing attributes, as well as country-specific constant terms and unobserved household 
perceptions about indebtedness that are taken into account in our estimations that exploit 
the panel dimension of the data.  
We then probe further into possible explanations behind this asymmetry. We 
initially draw from the growing research that examines the influence of income on 
subjective well-being. This literature has identified a key role for the comparison income 
effect that highlights the importance of interdependence among individual preferences.
3
                                                     
3 See for example the studies by Easterlin, 1995, Clark and Oswald, 1996 and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005. A well 
documented empirical finding of this literature is that individual well-being is affected not only by own income but also 9
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In this paper, we examine the possibility that households’ assessment of their own 
indebtedness is partly made with reference to the debt position of their peer group. 
Notably, we find new evidence that a non-trivial part of the reported distress is due to the 
fact that own indebtedness exceeds the median debt burden of reference households. This 
effect is net of own indebtedness, own income, various demographics and housing 
attributes, while our estimation takes into account household-specific unobserved 
heterogeneity and allows for country-specific constant terms.  
Reference to the debt load of other households is estimated to have a particularly 
strong effect on reported distress in countries with less expanded mortgage markets, 
while it is not quantitatively significant in countries with a high share of mortgage 
holders. These results imply that households evaluate their own debt burden partly in 
comparison to the debt load of their peer group and in a way consistent with social stigma 
considerations. Such considerations seem to induce additional distress among mortgage 
holders in the less expanded mortgage markets, and they are likely, other things equal, to 
discourage households from assuming a higher debt burden. On the other hand, as the 
pool of mortgage holders gets larger, households appear less concerned about their own 
indebtedness in comparison to that of their reference group and thus relative indebtedness 
does not represent any more a limiting factor for assuming a higher debt burden. 
Finally, we compare differences in distress across countries due to a given debt 
load with various aggregate indicators of the institutional environment prevailing in each 
country as well as with cultural differences in household views about indebtedness and in 
                                                                                                                                                             
by comparisons to the income of the reference group. The higher the own income of a given individual is in 
comparison to the income of other people in society, the higher the welfare of this individual, other things equal. We 
will review this literature and discuss its links to our study in more detail in Section 3. 10
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reporting styles. This examination points to the importance of expanded mortgage and 
credit markets and of the easier access to liquidity that these facilitate in reducing 
financial distress among households with a high debt burden in the UK, Denmark, and 
the Netherlands.     
Taken together, our findings suggest that more expanded credit markets in 
general tend towards smoothing consumption over the lifecycle and decreasing the 
distress households feel from servicing a high debt burden. That is households’ 
assessment of a debt burden and their sense of responsibility with regard to borrowing 
may tend to diminish and this process can be reinforced by reference to other households 
in the growing pool of debt holders. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents background 
information on home ownership rates and the expansion of mortgage markets in 12 
European countries. Section 3 briefly reviews the related literature, presents the 
econometric model, and discusses empirical results from the baseline specification. 
Section 4 extends the analysis of the previous section to examine the role of the relative 
indebtedness. Section 5 discusses the links with various country-specific institutional 
indicators. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. Home ownership rates and mortgage markets in Europe
We utilise survey data from the ECHP, a rich source of information on European 
households’ well being, mortgage indebtedness, demographic characteristics, and 
housing attributes. Its common design facilitates a direct cross-country comparison that is 
not affected by data differences due to definitions or measurement. The period from 1994 11
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(the first year that data from this survey were made available) to 2001 was a period of 
decreasing interest rates, while more recently households have experienced an increase in 
interest rates and a boom in housing prices, at least until 2007. 
Home ownership and mortgage rates from 2001 (i.e. the most recent ECHP wave) 
both unconditional and conditional (among home owners), are summarized in Table 1. 
For each figure, we also report the difference (in percentage points) since 1994. The 
incidence of home ownership is quite heterogeneous across European countries. Spain, 
Greece, and Italy show the highest rates with more than 75% of households owning the 
house they live in. There are also high home ownership rates in Belgium, the UK, and 
Portugal. At the other extreme, Austria and Germany display the lowest rates, with less 
than 50% of German households classified as owners. Data suggest an expansion in home 
ownership across Europe in the second half of 1990s, particularly in Denmark.  
Home ownership rates in Europe do not correlate with the breadth of mortgage 
markets. According to the conditional percentage of mortgage holders more than eight 
out of ten home owners in the Netherlands and Denmark have a mortgage outstanding. 
Owning a home through a mortgage is also quite common in the UK. On the other hand, 
in the Southern countries where home ownership is widespread, only a minority of 
households has a mortgage, with the most pronounced cases being Italy and Greece 
where 15% and 10% of homeowners respectively have a mortgage outstanding. Even in 
some central countries with quite high home ownership rates, like France and Belgium, 
mortgage outstanding rates among owners are well below 50%. Looking at changes since 
1994, we observe that Portugal represents the case with the largest expansion in mortgage 
markets over the period considered, followed by Spain. The picture is quite different for 12
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1156
February 2010
Italy and Greece where home ownership has increased at a faster pace compared to 
mortgage outstanding rates.  
In Table 2, we present some macro indicators that show that mortgage markets are 
significantly expanded in Denmark, the Netherlands, and the UK, while they are much 
less expanded in Southern countries. In particular, the household debt to GDP ratio is the 
largest in the three former countries and quite small in Southern ones. Furthermore, as the 
aggregate indicator of domestic credit market regulation suggests, the first three countries 
have relatively deregulated private banking systems compared to those in the South.  
3. Which factors contribute to financial distress among mortgage holders? 
3.1 General Framework 
Existing literature has studied the association between household indebtedness 
and various socio-economic determinants by mainly focusing on factors that influence 
household arrears. May and Tudela (2005) find that British households with an 
unemployed head and with a high loan to value ratio have greater difficulties in meeting 
scheduled mortgage payments. Del Rio and Young (2005) show that the higher the 
unsecured debt to income ratio and the mortgage income gearing, the more the problems 
in servicing debts. Diaz-Serrano (2004) examines, using the ECHP, the determinants of 
mortgage delinquency across 12 EU countries. He documents a positive association 
between income volatility and the risk of mortgage delinquency. Duygan and Grant 
(2009) employ the same data to examine the effects of adverse shocks that households 
experience (e.g. unemployment) on the likelihood to fall into arrears. They find that 
adverse events are important, but the extent to which they matter varies across countries 13
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according to institutional differences in punishment and cost of default. Furthermore, 
there are studies presenting descriptive evidence on the distribution of debt across 
households with different characteristics in a given country (see for example Beer, 
Mooslechner, Schurz, and Wagner, 2006 for Austria; Herrala, 2006 for Finland; 
Carrascal, 2004 for Spain; Farinha, 2003 for Portugal; and Tudela and Young, 2003 for 
the UK). 
In a related framework, various studies have emphasized the role of social stigma 
on US households’ decision to file for bankruptcy. Fay, Hurst and White (2002) show 
that such a decision is positively influenced by the financial benefit from filing and by the 
filing rates in the region of residence that represent an inverse proxy for the level of 
bankruptcy stigma. Gross and Souleles (2002) using administrative data find that after 
taking into account changes in risk related and economic factors, the propensity to default 
has increased over time, which can be attributed to a fall in stigma. 
A different strand of literature has utilized survey data with self-reported 
information on happiness or general well-being to examine associations with individual 
income (mainly) and other demographics. Most of the studies document a positive, but 
relatively limited association between income and subjective well-being (see for 
example, Clark and Oswald, 1994 for the UK; Frey and Stutzer, 2000 for Switzerland; 
and Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004 for Germany).  
In the above context, a growing literature examines the possibility that individual 
well-being is affected to a significant extent by comparisons with the income of a 
reference group. A common empirical finding of these studies is that individual well-
being is negatively influenced by others’ income (for early studies that point to 14
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preference interdependence and the negative impact of income earned by a reference 
group on an individual’s utility, see Kapteyn, van Praag and Herwaarden, 1978 and 
Kapteyn and Herwaarden, 1980). Clark and Oswald (1996) find evidence that a worker’s 
job satisfaction is negatively affected by the income earned by other individuals in her 
reference group. McBride (2001) shows that individuals who believe that they are in a 
worse financial position relative to their own parents or earn less in comparison to their 
reference group are less satisfied. Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) using German panel data has 
examined in more detail the importance of comparison income for individual satisfaction. 
The author finds that the income of the reference group is as important as the own income 
for an individual’s well-being and that individuals tend to be better-off the larger their 
income is in comparison with the income of their peers. 
There is also emerging research that finds peer group effects on household 
consumption and portfolio decisions. Various studies have argued that individual 
consumption behavior is determined to some extent by reference to the consumption 
decisions of other households (see for example, Frank, 1985, Childers and Rao 1992, and 
Charles, Hurst and Roussanov, 2007). Madrian and Shea (2001) and Duflo and Saez 
(2002) show that individuals’ decisions about their retirement investment plans are 
influenced by the choices of their work colleagues. Hong, Kubik and Stein (2004) 
provide evidence that sociability fosters stock market participation possibly because 
information acquired through word-of-mouth lowers information costs. Consistent with a 
peer-effects story the authors estimate stronger effects of sociability in US states with 
widespread stock market participation. 15
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1156
February 2010
Our analysis is partly motivated by the literature examining the effect of income 
on subjective well-being and the role of the comparison income effect. We first study the 
extent to which mortgage indebtedness influences reported financial distress. Then, we 
link reported distress with every household’s debt burden in comparison to that assumed 
by its reference group. With reference to studies examining the determinants of 
household arrears, our focus tends to be broader. The incidence of arrears is typically 
relevant for a relatively small share of households. Households under heavy distress due 
to a high exposure to debt do not only run the risk of falling into arrears, but they are also 
more likely to make considerable adjustments to their consumption, portfolio, and 
borrowing behaviour. In addition, choosing to service a debt burden that can later 
represent a significant source of distress can be indicative of limited financial 
sophistication and poor financial planning. Thus, understanding how households assess 
their indebtedness and what shapes their attitudes towards borrowing can offer useful 
insights to economists, practitioners, and policy makers. 
We base our empirical investigation on information drawn from the following 
specialised question that is asked to mortgage holders: “Please think of your total 
housing cost including mortgage repayments, repairs, municipal or property tax, heating, 
water and sewerage charges. To what extent are housing costs a financial burden to 
you?”. Each household can choose among the following answers: “a heavy burden”, 
“somewhat a burden”, and “not a problem”. The question is designed to capture 
households’ perceptions about the influence of mortgage repayments and housing costs in 
particular, on their financial situation more generally. Given that this question explicitly 
links housing costs with financial difficulties and that information on various housing 16
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attributes capturing housing related expenditures is available in the survey, we are in a 
position to investigate more closely the effect of mortgage indebtedness on financial 
distress.  
Table 3 summarizes responses to the question of interest across countries. Higher 
levels of distress among mortgage holders are reported in Italy, Spain, Greece, and 
Portugal, while the lowest levels are found in the Netherlands, the UK, Denmark, and 
Austria. We also report the mean, median, lower and upper quartiles, and standard 
deviation of the mortgage debt to income ratio that - with the exemptions of Austria and 
Greece - are quite similar across countries. The average median ratio implies that a 
typical European mortgage holder pays 18% of her income in servicing her mortgage 
debt. These summary statistics do not suggest an obvious correlation pattern between the 
mortgage debt to income ratio and household financial distress.  
3.2 Model specification  
Our model description follows that of Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) who has used 
panel data to study the effects of own and comparison income on self-reported well-
being. Household distress due to housing costs is not directly observable. What is 
observed instead is a household’s assessment of whether such costs represent a heavy 
financial burden (if the latent distress exceeds some critical threshold) or not (if the latent 
distress is below this threshold). We can express the latent distress due to housing costs 
(dhc
*), using the following specification: 
it it it it it it u Y DSR DSR X c dhc        ) log(
2
2 1
' * G J J E                              (1) 17
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1156
February 2010
where  i  is a household specific index, t represents time, Xit is a matrix of observed 
variables made up of various household demographics and housing attributes and uit is an 
error term. In addition, we also allow for a non-linear influence of after tax income (Y)
and of the mortgage debt to income ratio (DSR) that a household has to service.
4 Thus, 
the latter represents an indicator of indebtedness at given levels of income. 
 Given the panel nature of the survey, we can adjust specification (1) to take into 
account time fixed effects and individual-specific random effects. With reference to the 
former, we include year dummies that allow for time changes that affect all households. 
In our set-up the time dummies are likely to capture yearly changes in housing prices, in 
housing costs, and/ or in mortgage interest rates. The individual random effects represent 
unobserved personal traits and attitudes that are time-invariant unit-specific, like 
household optimism or perceptions about indebtedness. Thus, provided that answers to 
the question about distress are to some extent subjective, we take into account the 
possibility that for given X’s, income, and degree of indebtedness, those households with 
a positive outlook on life or lower aversion to debt will tend to report lower distress 
compared to their more pessimistic or debt-averse counterparts. The error term in (1) can 
be written as a function of two components, a household-specific component that does 
not vary with time and a remainder component which is assumed to be uncorrelated over 
time:  
it i it u H D                                                                                                  (2)       
                                                     
4 DSR is calculated as the ratio of mortgage debt repayment (i.e. last month’s mortgage instalment multiplied by 12) 
over the yearly net household income. Thus, the use of a logarithmic transformation in order to capture the non-linear 
effects of DSR (instead of a second order polynomial) would have cancelled out the logarithm of net income term. In 
addition, a DSR second order polynomial found preferable against alternative functional forms in terms of model’s 
goodness of fit according to both the Akaike and Schwarz information criteria. 18
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Both error components are assumed to be independently distributed from other 
covariates in the model. In our set up, this is a rather strong assumption given that 
optimism and perceptions about debt are likely to correlate with income and the degree of 
indebtedness. To take into account this possibility we allow individual household effects 
in our panel specification to be determined by time averages of (a subset of) the 
observable variables (see Mundlak, 1978): 
i i i Z a Z S   
'                                                                                             (3) 
where Ȧi is iid. In Z we include variables such as the mortgage debt to income ratio (and 
its square) and net income. Then, by incorporating time fixed effects and individual 
random effects, specification (1) can be rewritten as:  
it i i it it it it it Z Y DSR DSR X T c dhc H Z S G J J E W          
' 2
2 1
' * ) log(     (4) 
where  ) , 0 ( ~ Z V Z N i  and  ) 1 , 0 ( ~ N it H  that is also assumed to be uncorrelated over time. 
Under the above assumptions, we estimate the random effects probit which incorporates 
the Mundlak adjustment producing consistent estimates. We estimate specification (4) 
separately for each country over the full unbalanced panel of households with a mortgage 
outstanding.  
With reference to the household demographics we take into account the age of the 
household head and his/her employment status (self employed, retired, other 
inactive/unemployed, with employees forming the omitted category). We control for 
gender and marital status by group dummies that distinguish among single males, couples 
living together and single females (that form the reference group). We also add a dummy 
representing children aged less than 16 years in the household. Younger children act both 19
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as a strain on current resources and may be associated with committed future 
expenditures, thus increasing the financial demands on a household. In addition, we take 
into account the educational attainment of the household head (college graduate, high 
school graduate, with those with less than high school education being in the reference 
group) that can approximate (future) income prospects.
5 Education may also account for 
households’ ability to identify the best terms and conditions when they borrow and to re-
mortgage on time when they face favourable conditions. Moreover, we account for the 
likely distress that bad health may generate. In particular, we control for the worse 
reported health status within a household, given that families may be affected in their 
borrowing decisions as well as in the financial difficulties they report by the adverse 
health condition of any of their household members.  
We also distinguish immigrant households, given that they may face additional 
economic difficulties, e.g. through greater job uncertainty. Moreover, we include two 
indicators of sociability, showing whether the household head participates in a political or 
social/sports club or organization and whether he often meets friends. More sociable 
households may be more likely to get financial support from family and friends, like 
money transfers helping younger households to meet their mortgage payments. The role 
of such informal credit channels can be particularly important in countries with less 
expanded credit markets.  
The data offer enough information to allow us to account for housing attributes 
that are related to housing costs. We control for size of the home by including a 
                                                     
5 Lifecycle models predict that households facing upward future income profiles (such as the more educated) should 
optimally borrow early on in life. 20
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categorical variable that represents the number of rooms. We also take into account the 
number of years that a household lives in its current accommodation which proxies for 
the time elapsed since a mortgage was taken out. This is also likely to capture any 
relevant repair and maintenance costs that are typically higher for older accommodation. 
Furthermore, we take into consideration differences due to the type of accommodation, 
using a flexible specification with single dummies that represent the following types: 
detached single-family house, semi-detached or terraced single-family house, apartment 
or flat in a building with less than 10 dwellings, apartment or flat in a building with 10 or 
more dwellings and other accommodation (that forms the base category).  
Finally, we have incorporated a complete set of dummy variables representing the 
regions in which a household lives in each country. This is potentially important given 
that housing prices and housing costs can vary across regions within a country and a 
specification that accounts for differences due to regional-specific factors facilitates an 
even closer investigation of the effects of mortgage indebtedness on households’ 
financial difficulties. In what follows we present results from models that are estimated 
independently for each country, which is the most flexible specification that one can 
employ.
6 As we discuss in Section 5, constant terms in these models pick up a significant 
part of differences in various country-wide factors that are likely to affect country 
heterogeneity in reported distress. 
                                                     
6 Estimating the model independently for each country is equivalent to estimating the same model for the pooled 
sample of countries when the latter includes, apart from the set of covariates, country dummies as well as a full set of 
interaction terms of each covariate with country dummies. 21
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3.3 Discussion of Results 
Coefficients from discrete choice models are not directly interpretable, thus we 
calculate and report average - across mortgage holders in each country - marginal effects 
on the probability of declaring housing costs as a heavy burden along with their 
significance. Marginal effects for selected covariates are presented in Table 4 for every 
country separately.   
In all countries, health problems significantly increase the likelihood of reporting 
housing costs as a heavy burden. The estimated effects are particularly strong in Southern 
countries (Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece) and in Finland. Households with health 
problems typically face higher job and income uncertainty as well as increased medical 
expenses and these factors contribute to higher distress. Children are often thought to act 
as an additional strain on resources and this is likely to be reflected in the positive 
significant estimates we derive for most of the countries. These results imply that 
households may have not fully taken into account the costs associated with children 
before deciding to borrow and thus children show up as an additional source of distress 
when servicing mortgage debt.  
We find that education significantly reduces financial distress in Southern 
countries and in Austria. Better-educated households are likely to be more capable of 
understanding mortgage terms and conditions and to shop around for the best alternatives 
before borrowing. In a recent study Lussardi and Tufano (2008) present evidence that 
households with lower financial literacy tend to judge their debt as excessive. Such 
differences in financial sophistication and in borrowing practices are likely to reflect 
upon financial distress when servicing the debt and seem to be more relevant in countries 22
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with less expanded mortgage markets. Higher education may also account for better 
career prospects and thus households that enjoy job security and face upward-sloping 
future income profiles appear - in the aforementioned countries - less distressed relative 
to their less educated counterparts with a mortgage outstanding. 
As regards the role of labor status, the self employed, despite their exposure to 
entrepreneurial risk, appear less concerned about financial difficulties - compared to 
employees - in Southern countries, France, Belgium, Germany, and Finland. This result 
may be due to some broader wealth effects. It may also reflect the fact that entrepreneurs 
are more familiar with the idea of borrowing relative to employees who have a mortgage 
outstanding and this difference becomes more evident in the less expanded markets. On 
the other hand, in almost all countries, being unemployed increases the probability of 
declaring distress. The effect is consistent with liquidity constraints and the poorer job 
prospects that the unemployed usually face.  
We find that controlling for income, labor status, and rate of indebtedness, 
immigrant households are more distressed only in France. On the other hand, they are 
less distressed in Finland, Spain and Portugal, while the effects in the other countries are 
insignificant.
7 These results suggest that immigrants who have received approval for a 
mortgage form a well established group with good and stable longer run job prospects in 
the host country and similar or even less financial difficulties compared to natives. As 
regards the two sociability indicators they do not suggest any significant influence with 
                                                     
7 Information about immigrant status is not available in the United Kingdom and Germany, while in the Netherlands 
being an immigrant predicts financial distress perfectly.  23
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the only exception being interactions with friends, which imply higher distress in Finland 
and in Greece. 
We also find that for most countries in the sample income levels matter and that 
those with higher disposable incomes, controlling for the degree of indebtedness and 
various other factors, are less financially distressed.
8 Households with higher net income 
levels, even if they have to sustain a high mortgage debt to income ratio, have more 
money available to spend and meet the basic standards of living. In addition, they are 
likely to enjoy easier access to other forms of credit that can boost their liquidity.
9
Estimates on housing attributes do not show a uniform picture and this is likely to 
arise from differences in housing conditions across European countries. For example, the 
number of years lived in a home contributes positively to reported distress in Finland, 
France, and Spain. The size of the home is associated with higher distress in Denmark 
and lower distress in the UK, Germany, Spain, Portugal, and Greece.  
Given that we control for household income as a separate regressor, we measure 
the effect of the DSR on reported distress due to housing costs net of the level of (ppp-
adjusted) disposable income. We present the relevant effect of our key variable of interest 
in two ways. First, in Table 4 we show the average influence on reported distress from an 
assumed 10 percentage points (pp) increase in the mortgage debt to income ratio. Second, 
we compute and plot the predicted probabilities of distress for each country over a wide 
spectrum of mortgage debt to income ratios (from .01 to 1) based on the regression 
                                                     
8 We report average marginal effects that refer to a change in the probability of declaring housing costs being a heavy 
burden as a result of an assumed 1,000 (ppp-adjusted) monetary units increase in income that take into account apart 
from the increase in income levels the associated decrease in mortgage debt to income ratio. 
9 We also experiment with specifications that include a dummy for whether households have any consumer debt and 
the results are similar to those we present.  24
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1156
February 2010
models we have estimated. The graphs are illustrated in Figure 1. In each graph, we 
superimpose a vertical line indicating a ratio of 0.3. This is a ‘benchmark’ cut off point 
that is frequently used by financial practitioners to classify an individual as a risky 
borrower in the sense that it is likely to face severe difficulties in servicing her debt.
10
In all countries, an assumed 10 pp increase in the mortgage debt to income ratio 
implies significantly higher probabilities of reporting financial difficulties. The 
quantitatively strongest effects are derived in Belgium, Spain, Portugal, and Greece, 
while the smallest ones in the UK and the Netherlands. By looking at Figure 1, it 
becomes apparent that the probability of reporting distress as a function of mortgage debt 
to income ratio, after controlling for various factors, are very different across countries.  
On the one hand, mainly in Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece, but also in Belgium and 
France, mortgage indebtedness represents a major source of distress. On the other hand, 
much smaller effects are derived for the UK, the Netherlands, and Denmark, while 
intermediate effects are implied for Germany, Finland, and Austria. In other words, a 
typical mortgage holder in Italy or Spain, who spends for example half of her income in 
servicing her debt, reports much higher distress than her counterpart in the UK or the 
Netherlands. This effect is estimated net of (ppp-adjusted) after tax incomes levels, 
various demographics, regional variation, housing attributes, and individual-specific 
unobserved heterogeneity. Our estimation also allows for country-specific constant terms 
that capture a significant part of country fixed effects.  
In a later section we probe further into the aforementioned asymmetry by 
examining the potential links with the institutional environment prevailing in each 
                                                     
10 See for example DeVaney and Lytton (1995). 25
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country. Before doing so, we extend the analysis of the current section to examine the 
possibility that households’ assessment about their own debt burden is made to some 
extent with reference to the debt load of households in their comparison group. As it was 
discussed this investigation is partly motivated from the well documented empirical 
finding that self-reported well-being is negatively influenced by the income of the 
reference group.  
4. The role of relative mortgage indebtedness 
In the previous section we showed that the rate of indebtedness represents a 
significant source of financial distress for households and that the estimated effects were 
particularly strong in countries with less expanded mortgage markets. In this section we 
examine the possibility that declared distress is also affected by reference to the debt 
burden of other households in a given country. This would mean that households do not 
assess their own indebtedness based only on their own preferences, resources, and 
configuration of characteristics. 
Following existing literature on subjective well-being and happiness we combine 
criteria like age and education to define a reference group within each country (see e.g. 
Clark and Oswald, 1996 and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005). More specifically, within each 
country we consider five-year bands over the age range of our sample (20 to 75), which 
are combined with more than high school and less than high school educational 
attainment to produce twenty two age-education cells. Then, we calculate for each age-
education cell the median mortgage debt to income ratio among mortgage holders. In our 
‘baseline’ model (1), which takes into account own net income, own debt burden, various 26
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demographics and housing attributes, we add a dummy indicator that is equal to one if a 
household has a mortgage debt to income ratio in excess of the median corresponding 
ratio of its reference group and zero otherwise.  
Marginal effects and associated standard errors with respect to own and relative 
indebtedness are presented in Table 5. Results suggest that a mortgage debt to income 
ratio in excess of the corresponding median burden of reference households represents an 
independent source of distress in most of the countries. That is, relative indebtedness 
matters for distress and has an effect over and above the influence of own income and 
own mortgage debt to income ratio. The implied effects are consistent with social stigma 
considerations and are particularly strong in Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Belgium. 
For example, a mortgage holder in Italy with a given income and debt burden to service 
has a 7 pp higher probability to declare financial difficulties due to the fact that her own 
indebtedness exceeds that of her reference group. 
  On the other hand, the corresponding effects in countries with expanded 
mortgage markets are either quantitatively unimportant (UK, Netherlands) or statistically 
insignificant (Denmark). This suggests that over-indebtedness relative to the debt burden 
of the reference group does not represent a considerable source of distress in countries 
where a significant segment of the population has a mortgage outstanding. The results we 
present above have been proved robust to alternative definitions of the reference group as 
well as to different functional forms of the baseline model. Results from these robustness 
exercises are presented in Appendix A. 
All in all, our findings point to an independent role of relative over-indebtedness 
on financial distress that is stronger in countries where a smaller segment of the 27
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population has a mortgage outstanding. Such a role is consistent with social stigma 
considerations of those with a debt load in excess of that of reference households in 
countries with less expanded markets. Yet, the distress that reference to the debt burden 
of other households generates tends to be eliminated in countries where a sizeable portion 
of the population uses mortgage debt. That is, households’ assessment of the debt burden 
diminishes as the share of mortgage holders increases and subsequently households in 
these countries are - other things equal - less concerned about servicing a given debt 
burden. 
Still, results from this section suggest that a given level of own indebtedness 
creates higher distress in less expanded mortgage markets, even when the influence of 
relative indebtedness, ppp-adjusted income levels, and various household characteristics, 
as well as country-specific constant terms have been taken into account. In what follows, 
we attempt to link this asymmetry, identified from survey data, with various aggregate 
indicators of the institutional and social environment in each country. 
5. Cross country differences in institutions and household beliefs about debt 
It should be noted that a significant part of country-wide differences in reported 
distress are picked up by the country-specific constant terms in our models. Such 
differences can range from country differences in the legal, institutional, and banking 
environment to differences in culture and in reporting style. Recent studies have 
attempted to associate international disparities in household debt repayment behaviour 
with particular aspects of the institutional environment prevailing in each country. Such 
associations are modelled by using relevant country-invariant indicators as additional 28
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regressors to household-specific characteristics.
11 Given that our study focuses on 
disparities in the effect of household-specific indebtedness on reported distress, we 
choose to account for any country wide differences at large by allowing for country-
specific constant terms. Yet, it still may be the case that some remaining country-wide 
discrepancies partly show up in differences in the estimated marginal effects of the 
household-level variable of interest. Hence, in what follows we present various aggregate 
indicators that are likely to influence reported distress and we discuss their possible links 
with the pattern we identify from the survey data (i.e. the asymmetric effect that a given 
debt burden implies for reported distress across different groups of countries). 
5.1 The efficiency of contract enforcement 
We first examine the possibility that households report higher levels of distress in 
countries with an institutional environment that is more efficient in the collection of 
overdue debt, making default an even tougher option for the heavily indebted. Following 
Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007) we look at three indicators that are suggestive of 
the efficiency of contract enforcement across countries: the number of procedures from 
the moment the plaintiff files a claim in court until the moment of payment, the average 
number of days required to resolve a dispute, and court and attorney fees expressed as a 
percentage of the debt value. The above indicators are summarized in Table 6.  
                                                     
11 See for example Duygan and Grant (2009). They use a country invariant indicator of the number of days 
required to complete the judicial process as a proxy of country differences in the efficiency of the legal 
system in collecting overdue debts in order to examine the influence on household arrears. In these 
applications, given the structure of the data (a high number of households and relatively few countries), 
there is a limited number of country-invariant indicators that one can take into account, since they will be 
mutually highly collinear. Obviously, one can not use in addition country dummies to account for any 
remaining country differences, given that these dummies will introduce perfect collinearity. Furthermore, 
nothing guarantees that estimated effects on these (few) indicators will not pick up various other country 
differences which can not be taken into account explicitly. 29
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These indicators suggest that punishment costs are not much smaller in countries 
with expanded mortgage markets, where households are found to be less distressed when 
they service a high debt burden. On the other hand, in countries like Italy, where 
households are more distressed for each given rate of indebtedness, it is more costly for 
lenders to collect any overdue debts. Overall, higher efficiency of the institutional 
environment as regards contract enforcement does not seem to relate to household 
propensity to report more financial difficulties in less expanded markets.   
5.2 Changes in housing prices 
Another hypothesis to consider is that households report less distress for a given 
debt to mortgage ratio in countries that have witnessed a significant appreciation in house 
prices, effectively reducing the debt burden relative to household wealth.
12 The first block 
(I) of Table 7 presents real and nominal house price changes, both over the longer term 
and over the period captured by the ECHP data, which indeed show rapidly increasing 
house prices for the UK, Denmark, and the Netherlands, but also for Spain and Greece. 
Thus, an appreciation in house prices alone does not seem sufficient to explain the pattern 
of distress that we identified in the data. 
5.3 The role of credit institutions 
Households may also report less distress for a given mortgage debt load if they 
benefit from the greater availability of credit allowing them easier access to liquidity and 
more options to refinance. A second block (II) of indicators in Table 7 shows support for 
the notion that households experience relatively less distress in countries with more 
                                                     
12 In principle the time and regional dummies in our model should have adequately captured such effects. 30
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expanded mortgage and credit markets. For example, households in the UK, Denmark, 
and the Netherlands face a greater variety of financial products (specialised loans) and a 
higher supply of loans via the securitisation of mortgages, and are able to take out a 
larger mortgage relative to the value of a property purchased.  
A final hypothesis, which seems to be strongly backed by the available cross-
country indices, is that households experience less stress where mortgage repayments are 
more predictable and facilitate household financial planning. The third block (III) of 
indicators in Table 7 identifies Denmark and the Netherlands as countries with a high 
proportion of loans with long interest rate fixation periods. A different way of looking at 
this is to consider the volatility and average levels of interest rates. For example, if 
interest rates are volatile, borrowing households will be less likely to commit to floating-
rate mortgages. We present statistics on short and longer-term interest rate volatility in 
Table 8. The figures suggest indeed that the UK, Denmark, and the Netherlands have 
experienced much lower volatility and average interest rate levels compared to the other 
European countries. 
5.4 National differences in household views about debt and in response style 
As a final hypothesis, we examine the possibility that our results reflect country-
wide differences in household views regarding borrowing and/ or response style. It 
should be noted that our estimation has taken into account the fact that unobserved 
individual traits or perceptions about debt can affect reported distress in a given country. 
Yet, one may argue that the pattern we identify in the survey data is mainly driven by 
cultural disparities regarding borrowing or by cross-country differences in response styles 
and that such differences have not been adequately captured by the country-specific 31
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constant terms. For example, it may be the case that a typical Italian household finds 
borrowing dangerous or unethical compared to an average UK household and this could 
be the reason that a mortgage holder in Italy reports - on average - higher distress for a 
given debt burden compared to her British counterpart. Another possibility is that a 
typical Italian household systematically overstates financial difficulties in comparison to 
a UK counterpart. 
National differences in perceptions about borrowing may be partly shaped by a 
country’s history, traditions and norms, and may be partly the outcome of interactions 
with the prevailing institutional environment. In any case, if households find borrowing 
dangerous or have ethical barriers to buy on credit in countries with less expanded 
mortgage markets, then such cultural differences are likely to partly reflect upon our 
findings.
13 While such national differences in norms are not easy to quantify, in what 
follows we take a small step towards this direction. 
We employ survey data from Eurobarometer that is a survey frequently conducted 
across EU countries to measure Europeans views on various issues. We present statistics 
from Eurobarometer 56.0, which was conducted at the end of 2001 (i.e. the last year 
covered by the ECHP sample). Respondents are asked to indicate whether they agree or 
disagree with the following statement: 
“Buying on credit is more useful than dangerous” 
The shares of those who agree with this statement for the population as a whole 
and for mortgage holders in particular for each country are presented in Table 9. The 
                                                     
13 It should be noted that within-country cultural differences, if any, have been absorbed by the regional dummies in 
our models.  32
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reported statistics do not suggest a clear pattern that can be linked to the expansion of 
credit markets and to the pattern of the findings of the previous section. If anything, the 
highest share of those who find in general buying on credit more useful than dangerous is 
recorded in three of the countries with the less expanded mortgage markets (Spain, Italy, 
and Portugal).    
National differences in the way households tend to report subjective outcomes, 
like self-reported health status, have recently attracted research attention.
14 One way to 
shed more light on this issue is to look at correlations between reported distress and some 
objective outcomes that are indicative of a household’s financial situation. In figure 2 we 
look at cross-country correlations between the share of mortgage holders reporting 
distress and their ability to meet scheduled mortgage and other consumer loan payments. 
In addition, we examine correlations with the average number of durables in each 
country.
15 If households that report severe difficulties face actual problems with their 
finances, they should tend to fall more frequently into debt arrears and possess a smaller 
number of home durables.  
The descriptive evidence from these correlations appears consistent with this 
prior: countries with a higher share of mortgage holders who report distress tend to rank 
higher as regards the incidence of mortgage or other loan arrears and lower as regards the 
average number of home durables. These associations provide us with further confidence 
                                                     
14 In order to take into account cross-country differences in response scales regarding subjective questions, recent 
surveys ask from households to assess the same hypothetical scenario (vignettes). Based on these responses one can 
identify country-specific threshold parameters (see King et al., 2004). Information on vignettes is not available in the 
ECHP. 
15 Households are asked whether they were unable to pay schedule mortgage payments / hire purchase instalments or 
other loan repayments during the past 12 months preceding the interview. With reference to home durables we consider 
the number of items owned from the following list: colour television, video recorder, microwave,  dishwasher, 
telephone, and home computer. 33
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that cross-country differences in reporting styles is not the driving force for the pattern 
we identify in the data.   
In sum, examination of various country-wide indicators in this section suggests 
the importance of the expanded mortgage and credit markets and of the easier access to 
liquidity that these facilitate in reducing financial distress among households with a high 
debt burden particularly in the UK, Denmark, and the Netherlands. 
6. Conclusions
This paper has studied households’ borrowing behaviour by exploring the links 
between mortgage indebtedness and financial distress across 12 European countries at 
different stages of mortgage market expansion. Our analysis yields insights into 
households’ assessment of debt and their propensity to assume a debt burden that under 
adverse macroeconomic conditions might prove infeasible to service.  
We find that less education, health problems, and unemployment generate 
financial distress in most countries. We also find that a higher mortgage debt to income 
ratio is a key determinant of financial distress. However, the debt load that a typical 
household has to service creates much higher distress in Southern countries, France, and 
Belgium, where relatively few have a mortgage outstanding compared to countries with 
expanded mortgage markets like the UK, the Netherlands, and Denmark. This effect is 
estimated net of ppp-adjusted income levels, a rich set of socioeconomic characteristics, 
housing attributes, and country-specific constant terms, while the panel nature of the data 
allows us to take into account unobserved household-specific traits that influence 
reported distress.  34
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  Further investigation suggests that incurring a debt burden above the median 
debt load of reference households represents an independent source of distress and this 
effect is net of own indebtedness, own income, various socio-economic characteristics, 
and housing attributes. This finding is consistent with social stigma considerations. 
Estimated effects on relative indebtedness are particularly strong in countries with less 
expanded mortgage markets, while they lose significance in countries with widespread 
mortgage debt. Our results imply that in the former case social stigma considerations are 
stronger and can discourage households from borrowing additional amounts. On the other 
hand, in countries with expanded mortgage markets households appear less worried about 
their relative debt position and therefore less concerned in assuming a higher debt burden. 
The comparison of our findings with various aggregate indicators suggests that 
the state of mortgage and credit market expansion also plays a role in explaining why 
households with a given debt burden to service are relatively less distressed in the UK, 
Denmark, and the Netherlands. An appreciation in house prices alone is not sufficient to 
explain cross-country differences in reported distress. Rather, households are found to 
experience less stress for a given amount of indebtedness in counties where average 
interest rate levels and volatility are lower, and thus where mortgage repayments are 
more predictable and facilitate household financial planning. Furthermore, the aggregate 
indicators support the notion that households should experience relatively less distress in 
countries with more expanded mortgage and credit markets where they can choose from a 
variety of financial products and are able to take out a larger mortgage relative to the 
value of a property purchased. On the other hand, the cross-country differences in 
reported distress do not seem to relate with national differences in the efficiency of 35
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institutions to collect overdue debts or cultural differences regarding the usefulness of 
credit or cross-country differences in reporting style.  
Given that the mortgage markets are relatively less expanded in many European 
countries, there is a significant potential for expansion. However, at the same time, there 
is an obvious need to ensure that this development supports “informed” borrowing. 
Identifying the rules to guide future policy is not immediately obvious. Our results 
suggest that as the pool of mortgage holders expands, households are less concerned 
about relative indebtedness and become accustomed to the idea of borrowing higher 
amounts. More expanded markets in general contribute to consumption smoothing and 
tend towards decreasing the financial distress households feel from holding debt. That is 
households’ assessment of the debt burden and the sense of responsibility about 
borrowing may diminish and this process can be reinforced by reference to other 
households in the same boat.  
This kind of attitude towards indebtedness that we have identified could be of key 
interest to policy makers. Assuming additional borrowing may not be a problem during 
periods of rising housing prices, low interest rates, and low unemployment. However, it 
may create several problems during economic turbulence and in the absence of an 
obvious “corrective” mechanism on which to rely. Policy makers need to take into 
account that expanded markets not only offer easier access to credit but are also likely to 
induce additional borrowing by mitigating the importance of the relative indebtedness. 
That is credit market expansion should be accompanied by financial education and more 
responsible lending from the side of financial institutions. 36
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Table 1: Home ownership and mortgage outstanding rates (in percentages)
 
    Home ownership rates 
Mortgage outstanding 
rates (Unconditional) 
Mortgage outstanding rates 




since 1994  2001 
Diff (p.p.) 





 a 39  -3
 a
UK 72  5  41  0  57  -4 
DK 67  13  56  10  83  -3 
DE 43  5  20  1  47  -3 
NL 54  7  47  9  88  5 
BE 74  7  33  3  44  0 
FR 63  8  26  1  42  -5 
AT 55 6
 a 22  3
 a 40  2
 a
IT 76  6  11  -2  15 -4 
ES 85  6  23  6  27  6 
PT 67  6  20  8  29 10 
GR 85  8 8  0  10  -1 
All 67  5  27  3  40  2 
Note: Source: weighted statistics from ECHP. 
aDifferences for FI and AT are calculated since 
1996 and 1995, respectively (i.e. the first years that data are available for these countries).40
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Table 2: Selected macroeconomic indicators of credit market expansion 
Aggregate indicator of 
domestic credit market 
regulation (1)
Debt to GDP 













Note: (1) Source: Economic Freedom of the World 2007. Data is for 2001. Score between 0 and 
10. Countries that use a private banking system to allocate credit to private parties and refrain 
from controlling interest rates receive a higher rating. Indicator captures: i Ownership of banks: 
Percentage of deposits held in privately owned banks, ii Competition: Domestic banks face 
competition from foreign banks (GCR), iii Extension of credit: Percentage of credit extended to 
private sector, iv Avoidance of interest rate controls and regulations that lead to negative real 
interest rates, v Interest rate controls: Interest rate controls on bank deposits and/or loans are 
freely determined by the market (GCR). (2) Source: National sources, ECB calculations. 
Household debt / real GDP. Household debt comprises total loans to households from all 
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Table 3: Financial distress due to mortgage and housing costs and the distribution 
of mortgage debt to income ratio 
          
Mortgage Debt to Income Ratio  Housing costs 
are a heavy 
burden
25
th percentile Median  75
th percentile Mean  SD 
FI 0.20 0.13  0.19  0.27  0.21  0.13 
UK 0.07 0.10  0.16  0.24  0.20  0.20 
DK 0.07 0.13  0.19  0.27  0.22  0.16 
DE  0.13 0.10  0.19  0.29  0.22  0.20 
NL  0.01 0.12  0.18  0.26  0.20  0.16 
BE 0.21 0.11  0.16  0.22  0.19  0.16 
FR 0.19 0.14  0.20  0.27  0.22  0.15 
AT  0.12 0.03  0.08  0.17  0.13  0.19 
IT 0.47 0.10  0.18  0.29  0.23  0.22 
ES 0.42 0.12  0.19  0.29  0.24  0.21 
PT 0.33 0.09  0.18  0.29  0.22  0.22 
GR 0.32 0.03  0.08  0.16  0.13  0.19 
          
All 0.17 0.11  0.18  0.26  0.21  0.18 
Note: Source: Weighted statistics from the ECHP pooled sample of households with a mortgage 
outstanding from the years 1994-2001 (excluding those with more than 75 years old head or DSR 
in excess of 3).42
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Note (Table 4): Random Effects Probit regressions with Mundlak adjustment. The specification 
accounts for age and DSR through a 2
nd order polynomial and for income through a logarithmic 
transformation. It also includes the following terms: time and regional dummies, time averages of 
the logarithm of income and of DSR and its square. Marginal effects are averaged across 
households using survey weights. The calculation of marginal effects for DSR is based on a 10 pp 
increase and for income on a 1000 (ppp-adjusted) monetary units increase in the underlying 
variables, for house size on one extra room, and for age and for years stayed in the house on a one 
year increase. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 45
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Table 5: The effect of own indebtedness and of having a debt burden in excess of 
that of reference group on reported financial distress 
M.Eff t stat M.Eff t stat LL Rho
FI 0.0431 3.30 *** 0.0142 1.99 ** 6422 -2521 0.55 ***
UK 0.0113 2.15 ** 0.0059 2.20 ** 15260 -2955 0.49 ***
DK -0.0005 0.07 0.0278 7.43 *** 10527 -2017 0.54 ***
DE 0.0218 2.32 ** 0.0289 5.69 *** 9217 -2851 0.56 ***
NL 0.0067 3.06 *** 0.0027 1.82 * 17004 -952 0.28 ***
BE 0.0513 4.61 *** 0.0648 6.94 *** 7008 -2720 0.53 ***
FR 0.0231 2.19 ** 0.0471 5.78 *** 11133 -4451 0.45 ***
AT 0.0323 2.69 *** 0.0289 4.13 *** 4362 -1211 0.52 ***
IT 0.0727 4.18 *** 0.0206 2.35 *** 5759 -3052 0.59 ***
ES 0.0681 4.97 *** 0.0544 6.93 *** 8563 -4792 0.37 ***
PT 0.0835 5.28 *** 0.0596 6.77 *** 4658 -2132 0.57 ***
GR 0.1065 4.53 *** 0.0642 4.07 *** 2702 -1403 0.39 ***
Mortgage debt to 
income ratio
Debt burden above 
median of reference 
group
N
Note: Random Effects Probit regressions with Mundlak adjustment. The specification accounts 
for the same set of regressors as the model of Table 4 and a dummy that takes the value one if the 
household has a DSR in excess of the median DSR of the reference group (defined on the basis of 
age-education cells within each country). Marginal effects are averaged across households using 
survey weights. The calculation of marginal effects for DSR is based on a 10 pp increase in the 
underlying variable. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 46
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Table 6:  Contract Enforcement  







FI 32  247 11.1
UK 30  404 21.9
DK 34  380 24.6
DE 30  403 14.4
NL 25  514 24.4
BE  28  505 16.6
FR 30  331 17.4
AT 27  397 12.7
IT 41  1,390 29.9
ES 40  515 17.2
PT 36  577 14.2
GR 39  819 14.4
Note: Data from Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007). 47
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Table 9: Percentage of people who believe that buying on credit is more useful than 
dangerous 














Note: Source: Weighted statistics from Eurobarometer 56.0. 50
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Figure 1: Predicted probabilities of reported financial distress as a function of 




















.2 .3 .4 .6 .8 1
ES
.2 .3 .4 .6 .8 1
PT
.2 .3 .4 .6 .8 1
GR
Note: Average predicted probabilities of reported financial distress evaluated at different levels of 
DSR (derived from the model of Table 4). 51
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Appendix A 
We perform a series of robustness checks to examine the sensitivity of our 
findings on the role of relative indebtedness (Section 4, Table 5).  
First, we use alternative criteria to construct the cells that comprise households in 
the reference group. Instead of grouping households on the basis of age and educational 
attainment we combine information on age and the region of residence within each 
country. More specifically, within each region in a given country we consider four age 
bands: 20-29, 30-44, 45-59, and 60-75. In the case of Spain for example, where seven 
regions are distinguished, the regional-age combination amounts to twenty eight cells.
16
Then, as in Section 4, we calculate for each regional-age cell the median mortgage debt 
to income ratio among mortgage holders. Subsequently, in our ‘baseline’ model (1), we 
add a dummy indicator that is equal to one if a household has a mortgage debt to income 
ratio in excess of the median corresponding ratio of its reference group and zero 
otherwise. Results are shown in Table A1 and paint a similar picture to the one presented 
in Table 4 (the only exception is the estimated effect of relative indebtedness in Germany 
which now turns to be insignificant). We have also experimented with other definitions of 
the reference group by varying the age bandwidth and by combining educational 
attainment with region of residence and the results are similar to those we present. 
As an additional robustness check we define the reference group on a different 
basis. That is, we consider reference households from the pool of homeowners that 
comprise both outright home owners and mortgage holders. More specifically, we 
construct twenty two age-education cells in a similar fashion to our baseline specification 
(i.e. five-year bands over the age range of our sample combined with more than high 
school and less than high school educational attainment) among home-owning 
households in each country. Then for each age-education cell in the pool of home owners 
we calculate the mean mortgage debt to income ratio.
17 Next, we add to our baseline 
                                                     
16 Information on regions of residence is not available for households in DK and NL, thus in the current application 
cells are defined only over age groups in these countries. 
17 The respective median is zero in countries where the fraction of outright homeowners exceeds that of mortgage 
holders. 53
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specification a dummy that represents households with a mortgage debt to income ratio in 
excess of the mean corresponding ratio of the relevant reference group of homeowners. 
Table A2 summarizes the results. Having to service a debt above the mean of the 
corresponding burden of reference home-owning households represents an independent 
and sizeable source of distress in Spain, Portugal, and Greece, but also in France and 
Belgium. In sum, results suggest a similar pattern to that derived for reference households 
that defined over the pool of mortgage holders (with the exception of Italy), providing 
further support to the role of relative over indebtedness. 
 Second, we examine the possibility that our dummy representing a debt burden in 
excess of the median debt load of the reference group simply reflects an effect of excess 
own indebtedness that is not adequately captured by the DSR term and its square. In the 
specification we presented in Section 4 we control for non-linearities of both own income 
and own DSR. For the former we used a logarithmic transformation, while for the latter 
(given that is defined as the ratio of mortgage installment over income) a squared 
polynomial. Here, for robustness we assume the same functional form of own DSR and 
relative indebtedness to preclude the possibility that the effects that we have identified for 
the latter are simply due to the different functional form from that of the former.  
To that effect we first control for the influence of own DSR with a single dummy 
that takes the value one if a household’s DSR is above the median of the total distribution 
of DSR and zero otherwise. Results from this specification are presented in panel I of 
Table A3 and suggest a similar picture to the one derived from the baseline model 1 of 
Table 4. Having a more than median DSR to service creates higher distress in countries 
with less expanded mortgage markets, after accounting for ppp-adjusted income levels 
and a rich set of socioeconomic characteristics and housing attributes.  
Then, we add in the above specification a dummy representing a debt burden in 
excess of the median DSR of the reference group to take into account the effect of the 
relative indebtedness.
18 Marginal effects along with their significance on own DSR and 
on relative overindebtedness are presented in panel II of Table A3. The findings are 
                                                     
18 The reference group is defined the same way as in Section 4 (i.e. by combining information on age and education in 
each country). 54
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similar to those discussed in Section 4. Having a debt burden in excess of the median of 
the reference group has an independent and significant effect, net of the effect of own 
indebtedness (i.e. a more than median DSR), own income, various demographics and 
housing attributes. In countries where fewer households use mortgage debt the effects of 
relative indebtedness on reported distress are quantitatively significant and in some cases 
as high as those implied by the own debt load (e.g. Italy, Spain, Belgium, and Portugal).  55
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Table A1: The effect of own indebtedness and of having a debt burden in excess of 
that of reference group on reported financial distress 
M.Eff t stat  M.Eff t stat  N LL Rho
FI 0.0366 2.57 *** 0.0166 2.16 ** 6422 -2521 0.56 ***
UK 0.0126 2.32 ** 0.0057 2.05 ** 15260 -2953 0.51 ***
DK 0.0022 0.32 0.0299 7.96 *** 10527 -2021 0.54 ***
DE 0.0103 1.17 0.0319 6.14 *** 9217 -2852 0.56 ***
NL 0.0074 2.94 *** 0.0039 3.06 *** 17004 -954 0.28 ***
BE 0.0402 3.59 *** 0.0663 6.78 *** 7008 -2723 0.53 ***
FR 0.0423 3.98 *** 0.0407 4.94 *** 11133 -4444 0.45 ***
AT 0.0576 4.79 *** 0.0229 3.30 *** 4362 -1203 0.55 ***
IT 0.0463 2.79 *** 0.0264 2.90 *** 5759 -3056 0.59 ***
ES 0.0564 4.14 *** 0.0569 6.72 *** 8563 -4795 0.37 ***
PT 0.1035 5.97 *** 0.0564 6.08 *** 4658 -2125 0.57 ***
GR 0.1219 5.40 *** 0.0610 3.75 *** 2702 -1400 0.38 ***
Debt burden above 
median of reference 
group 
Mortgage debt to 
income ratio
Note: Random Effects Probit regressions with Mundlak adjustment. The model accounts for the 
same set of regressors as the specification presented in Table 4 and a dummy that takes the value 
one if the household has a DSR in excess of the median DSR of the reference group (defined on 
the basis of age-regional cells within each country). Marginal effects are averaged across 
households using survey weights. The calculation of marginal effects for DSR is based on a 10 pp 
increase in the underlying variable. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 56
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Table A2: The effect of own indebtedness and of having a debt burden in excess of 
that of reference group of home-owning households on reported financial distress 
M.Eff t stat  M.Eff t stat  N LL Rho
FI 0.0013 0.09 0.0264 3.50 *** 6422 -2525 0.56 ***
UK 0.0089 1.63 0.0062 2.21 ** 15260 -2954 0.51 ***
DK 0.0061 0.90 0.0253 6.50 *** 10527 -2013 0.58 ***
DE 0.0074 0.82 0.0329 6.75 *** 9217 -2853 0.56 ***
NL 0.0077 3.42 *** 0.0029 2.00 ** 17004 -937 0.51 ***
BE 0.0339 3.08 *** 0.0685 6.97 *** 7008 -2726 0.54 ***
FR 0.0323 3.28 *** 0.0468 5.67 *** 11133 -4448 0.45 ***
AT 0.0190 1.53 0.0328 4.52 *** 4362 -1212 0.55 ***
IT 0.0333 1.33 0.0343 4.13 *** 5759 -3059 0.60 ***
ES 0.0661 3.99 *** 0.0631 7.76 *** 8563 -4795 0.38 ***
PT 0.0981 4.95 *** 0.0713 8.05 *** 4658 -2132 0.58 ***
GR 0.1031 3.55 *** 0.0877 5.50 *** 2702 -1409 0.41 ***
Debt burden above 
mean of reference 
group 
Mortgage debt to 
income ratio
Note: Random Effects Probit regressions with Mundlak adjustment. The model accounts for the 
same set of regressors as the specification presented in Table 4 and a dummy that takes the value 
one if the household has a DSR in excess of the mean DSR of the reference group of home-
owning households (defined on the basis of age-education cells within each country). Marginal 
effects are averaged across households using survey weights. The calculation of marginal effects 
for DSR is based on a 10 pp increase in the underlying variable. ***,**,* denote significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 57
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Table A3: The effect of above median debt burden and relative indebtedness on 
financial distress 
M.Eff t  stat M.Eff t  stat M.Eff t  stat 
FI 0.0855 7.80 *** 0.0559 3.41 *** 0.0386 2.70 ***
UK 0.0222 4.72 *** 0.0127 1.89 * 0.0146 2.17 **
DK 0.0390 7.23 *** 0.0318 3.95 *** 0.0109 1.33
DE 0.0741 8.68 *** 0.0492 4.35 *** 0.0393 4.24 ***
NL 0.0081 3.75 *** 0.0023 0.79 0.0081 3.06 ***
BE 0.1035 9.35 *** 0.0647 5.03 *** 0.0620 4.87 ***
FR 0.0833 9.23 *** 0.0624 5.05 *** 0.0311 2.70 ***
AT 0.0733 6.03 *** 0.0433 2.85 *** 0.0422 2.97 ***
IT 0.1138 6.63 *** 0.0580 3.03 *** 0.0893 4.98 ***
ES 0.1389 10.45 *** 0.0849 5.23 *** 0.0812 5.26 ***
PT 0.1595 9.26 *** 0.1024 5.19 *** 0.1068 6.28 ***
GR 0.2371 9.72 *** 0.1852 6.76 *** 0.0825 3.35 ***
Debt burden above 
median Debt burden above 
median 
Debt burden above 




Note: Random Effects Probit regressions with Mundlak adjustment. The model of panel I 
accounts for DSR through a dummy that takes the value one if DSR is above the median of the 
total distribution of DSR. The rest of regressors (not reported) are the same as those in Table 4. 
The model of panel II includes in addition to the model of panel I a dummy that takes the value 
one if the household has a DSR in excess of the median DSR of the reference group (defined on 
the basis of age-educational cells within each country). Marginal effects are averaged across 
households using survey weights. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Working PaPer SerieS
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